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This paper investigates contagion at the German interbank market under the assumption
of a stochastic loss given default (LGD). We combine a unique data set about the LGD
of interbank loans with data about interbank exposures. We ﬁnd that the frequency dis-
tribution of the LGD is u-shaped. Under the assumption of a stochastic LGD, simulation
results show a more fragile banking system than under the assumption of a constant LGD.
There are three types of banks concerning their tendency to trigger contagion: banks with
strongly varying impact, banks whose impact is relatively constant, and banks with no
direct impact.
Keywords: Interbank market, contagion, stochastic LGD
JEL classiﬁcation: D53, E47, G21Non-technical summary
The interbank market is believed to be a channel through which the distress of one bank
spreads to other banks. At this market, large and sometimes unsecured loans are granted
among banks. The failure of one bank can thereby lead to the distress of the creditor
banks, which themselves can become the starting point of additional failures. With the
help of network models, the contagion eﬀects at the interbank market are assessed.
In this paper, we investigate these contagion eﬀects on the German interbank market,
limiting the analysis to 15 systemically relevant German banks. From data of the German
credit register, we establish the matrix of mutual exposures. The assumptions about the
loss given default (LGD) are important as well. We have only little information about the
LGD of a single interbank loan. However, our dataset makes it possible to precisely derive
the statistical distribution of the LGD of interbank loans. The simulation proceeds as
follows: At ﬁrst, we assume that one of the 15 banks fails. Then, we determine the losses
of the creditor banks. In the event that some of these banks fall into distress themselves,
a contagious process starts. This contagion process comes to an end when no new failures
occur in one round.
The results of the simulation study can be summarised in three core statements:
1. The empirical frequency distribution of the LGD at the interbank market is markedly
u-shaped, i.e. there are many observations with a very low loss rate (LGDs of up to
10%) and many observations with a very high loss rate (LGDs of more than 90%).
By contrast, there are relatively few observations in between (LGDs of 10% to 90%).
2. The simulations are run twice, once with a constant LGD in the amount of the
empirical average in our data (45%) and once with a stochastic LGD, drawn from
a distribution that is close to the empirical frequency distribution. The simulations
under the assumption of a stochastic LGD generally yield a more unstable system
than the simulations under the assumption of the corresponding constant LGD.
Thus, assuming a constant LGD, which is often done in the literature, leads to an
underestimation of the eﬀects of contagion.
3. We can identify three groups of banks concerning their impact on the ﬁnancial system
in the event that they are falling into distress: banks whose failure leads to stronglyvarying contagion eﬀects, depending on the actual realisation of the stochastic path;
banks whose failure leads to a relatively constant number of further failures; and
banks, having only a small amount of liabilities to the other banks, whose failure
does not result in further failures even in the most adverse situation.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Der Interbankenmarkt gilt als ein Kanal, ¨ uber den sich Schieﬂagen einer Bank auf andere
Banken ausbreiten. Auf diesem Markt werden großvolumige, mitunter unbesicherte Kre-
dite zwischen den Banken vergeben. Die Schieﬂage einer Bank kann dadurch zu Schieﬂa-
gen der Gl¨ aubigerbanken f¨ uhren, die dann selbst zum Ausgangspunkt weiterer Schieﬂa-
gen werden. Mit Hilfe von Netzwerkmodellen versucht man abzusch¨ atzen, mit welchen
Ansteckungseﬀekten am Interbankenmarkt gerechnet werden muss.
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir die Ansteckungseﬀekte f¨ ur den deutschen Inter-
bankenmarkt, wobei wir uns auf 15 systemrelevante deutsche Banken beschr¨ anken. Aus
Daten des Kreditregisters ermitteln wir die Matrix der gegenseitigen Kreditbeziehungen.
Wichtig sind auch die Annahmen ¨ uber die Verlustrate bei Ausfall (LGD). Wir haben
nur wenige Informationen ¨ uber die Verlustrate eines bestimmten Interbankenkredits. Je-
doch erm¨ oglicht es unser Datensatz, pr¨ azise Aussagen ¨ uber die statistische Verteilung der
Verlustrate von Interbankkrediten zu treﬀen. Die Simulation l¨ auft folgendermaßen ab:
Zun¨ achst nehmen wir an, eine der 15 Banken f¨ allt aus. Danach bestimmen wir die Ver-
luste bei den Gl¨ aubigerbanken. Sofern einige dieser Gl¨ aubigerbanken selbst in Schieﬂage
geraten, beginnt ein Ansteckungsprozess. Dieser Ansteckungsprozess setzt sich solange
fort, bis in einer Runde keine weiteren Ausf¨ alle auftreten.
Die Ergebnisse der Simulationsstudie lassen sich in drei Kernaussagen zusammenfassen:
1. Die empirische H¨ auﬁgkeitsverteilung der Verlustrate am Interbankenmarkt ist aus-
gepr¨ agt u-f¨ ormig, d.h. es gibt viele Beobachtungen mit sehr geringer Verlustrate
(LGDs bis 10%) und viele Beobachtungen mit sehr hoher Verlustrate (LGDs von
mehr als 90%), dagegen relativ wenige Beobachtungen im Bereich dazwischen (LGDs
von 10 bis 90%).
2. Die Simulationen werden zweimal durchgef¨ uhrt: einmal mit einer konstanten Ver-
lustrate in H¨ ohe des empirischen Mittelwertes in unseren Daten (45%) und einmal
mit einer zuf¨ alligen Verlustrate, wobei wir aus einer statistischen Verteilung ziehen,
die nahe an der empirischen H¨ auﬁgkeitsverteilung ist. Die Simulationen unter der
Annahme der zuf¨ alligen Verlustrate ergeben in der Regel ein instabileres System als
die Simulationen unter der Annahme der entsprechenden konstanten Verlustrate.Somit f¨ uhrt die in der Literatur h¨ auﬁg unterstellte konstante Verlustrate dazu, das
Ausmaß der Ansteckungseﬀekte zu untersch¨ atzen.
3. Wir k¨ onnen drei Gruppen von Banken unterscheiden, was die Auswirkungen einer
Schieﬂage auf das Bankensystem angeht: Banken, deren Ausfall zu stark unter-
schiedlichen Ansteckungseﬀekten f¨ uhrt, und zwar abh¨ angig davon, welcher Zufalls-
pfad gerade eingetreten ist; Banken, deren Ausfall zu einer relativ konstanten Zahl
von weiteren Ausf¨ allen f¨ uhrt; und Banken mit geringen Verbindlichkeiten gegen¨ uber
den anderen Banken, deren Ausfall selbst im ung¨ unstigsten Fall keine weiteren
Ausf¨ alle nach sich z¨ oge.Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Literature 3
3 Round-by-Round Algorithm 4
3.1 General procedure ................................ 4
3.2 Exposure at Default (EAD) ........................... 7
3.3 Stochastic Loss Given Default (LGD) ..................... 7
4 Results 11
4.1 Aggregate results ................................. 1 1
4.2 Identifying banks with similar contagion patterns ............... 1 4
4.3 Robustness checks ................................ 1 6
5 Conclusion 18Contagion at the Interbank Market with Stochastic LGD1
1 Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers turned the 2007 / 2008 turmoil into a deep global ﬁnan-
cial crisis. The tremendous eﬀects of the Lehman default were largely contagion eﬀects
which propagated and intensiﬁed the Lehman shock. In particular, the fear of contagion
via interbank markets played a crucial role in this process. While banks could gauge their
direct losses from transactions with Lehman Brothers, they could not assess their counter-
parties’ losses and creditworthiness and were therefore not willing to lend money to other
banks, causing the breakdown of interbank markets. This led to unprecedented liquidity
extension of central banks and government rescue packages (see Stolz and Wedow (2010))
which, however, could not avoid deep recessions in many countries of the world. From an
economic perspective, it is therefore essential to have a tool allowing to assess potential
contagion risks via interbank markets.
This is the aim of this paper. We study contagion at the German interbank market,
one of the largest interbank markets in Europe. We carry out a simulation exercise where
we assume that a certain bank fails and examine how this failure aﬀects other banks’
solvency via direct eﬀects and chain reactions in the banking system. Throughout this
paper, our focus is on 15 systemically relevant German banks. We analyze in particular
the role of the loss given default (LGD) in the contagion process and examine how the
assumption of a stochastic LGD aﬀects the results.
The LGD is a key factor for the extent of contagion. The LGD, multiplied by the total
exposure of a creditor bank to a debtor bank, gives the actual loss of the creditor bank in
the event of the debtor bank failing. The LGD can vary between 0% (eg in the event that
the defaulted loan is fully collateralized) and 100% (which is equivalent to a zero recovery
rate of the defaulted loan). As there is usually only sparse information about recovery
rates in the case of bank defaults, the standard approach in the literature on interbank
contagion is to assume a ﬁxed value of the LGD and repeat the simulation exercise with
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions of
the Deutsche Bundesbank. We thank Gabriel Frahm, Ulrich Kr¨ uger, Peter Raupach and the participants
of the research seminar of the Deutsche Bundesbank for valuable comments.
1diﬀerent values of this LGD. The literature generally ﬁnds that losses in the total banking
system crucially depend on the LGD value. Below a certain threshold of LGD, potential
losses are minor. However, as soon as the LGD exceeds a certain threshold, there are
considerable risks of large parts of the banking system being aﬀected and heavy losses
in the banking system occurring (see eg Upper and Worms (2004) and van Lelyveld and
Liedorp (2006)). Therefore, the standard approach has the considerable drawback that
an assessment of contagion risks in the real world is diﬃcult and associated with great
uncertainties. In our paper, we overcome this shortcoming by using a unique dataset of
realized LGDs of defaulted interbank exposures.
Our contributions are as follows. First, using this dataset of realized LGDs on the
interbank market, we are able to investigate the empirical pattern of actual LGDs. Second,
unlike the vast majority of papers in the literature, we do not need to estimate the amount
of interbank exposures nor do we rely on incomplete information from very large interbank
exposures. Instead, we are able to precisely quantify interbank exposures (including oﬀ-
balance sheet and derivative positions) within the national market. Third, in contrast to
most papers in the literature, we conduct the simulation exercise with a stochastic LGD
derived from the observed distribution of LGDs (instead of a stepwise increase of constant
values). We thereby obtain a distribution of the number of contagious bank defaults which
allows a more realistic assessment of contagion risks.
Our main ﬁndings are, ﬁrst, that LGDs follow a u-shaped distribution, which can be
reasonably well approximated by a beta distribution. Second, using the precise informa-
tion about interbank exposures and the distribution of LGD, we ﬁnd that the number of
bank defaults may increase substantially when we assume a stochastic LGD instead of a
constant one. Third, we observe three types of banks concerning their tendency to trigger
contagion: Banks with a u-shaped distribution of subsequent bank failures, banks with an
unimodal distribution of subsequent bank failures and banks where no subsequent bank
failure occurs.
The paper is structured in the following way: In Section 2, we give a brief overview of
the literature on interbank contagion as well as LGD modelling and state our contribution
to the literature. Section 3 deals with the description of the contagion exercise and its
main components (bilateral exposures, modelling of the LGD). In Section 4, we show the
results of the contagion exercise and in Section 5 the conclusion is presented.
22 Literature
Our paper relates to three strands of the literature. The ﬁrst strand is about empirical
simulation studies of interbank contagion (see Upper (2007) for an overview). Especially
national European interbank markets have been the focus of empirical studies (see, for
instance, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) for the Netherlands, Sheldon and Maurer (1998)
for Switzerland or Mistrulli (2007) for Italy). In addition to studies based on national
interbank markets, there are cross-border contagion simulations. These studies are either
based on BIS data on consolidated banking statistics (see Espinosa-Vega and Sol´ e (2010)
and Degryse et al. (2010)) or analyze international sector interlinkages (see Castr´ en and
Kavonius (2009)). Most papers in this strand do not have direct access to information on
interbank exposures, but apply either statistical methods to derive the bilateral exposures
or rely on data which cover only part of the interbank exposures. We have a certain
advantage compared to these studies since we are able to precisely quantify the amount of
bilateral exposures for a system of 15 large German banks. Our data set is based on the
German credit register and includes oﬀ-balance-sheet and derivative positions. It contains
all bilateral exposures of the 15 banks above a threshold of EUR 1.5 m. This threshold is
not relevant for the purpose of our study since interbank exposures are typically large.
The second strand of literature we contribute to deals with extensions of the usual
contagion exercises. Cifuentes et al. (2005) introduce additional stress due to declining
asset prices as a result of ﬁre sales; Elsinger et al. (2006) integrate the interbank contagion
model in a stress testing setting that includes macroeconomic shocks. Espinosa-Vega and
Sol´ e (2010) and Chan-Lau (2010) do not only consider credit risk, but funding risk as
well. They argue that the banks’ funding is hindered when the interbank market does
not function properly. Aikman et al. (2009) incorporate various of these aspects into one
quantitative model of systemic stability. Degryse and Nguyen (2007) explicitly model
the LGDs, deriving them endogenously from the banks’ balance sheet composition. Our
extension is about LGD modelling as well. However, we model the LGDs as stochastic.
The third strand of literature deals with the distribution of LGDs. Huang et al. (2009)
and Tarashev and Zhu (2008) choose a stochastic setting for the LGD. They assume a
triangular distribution with the probability mass concentrated in the center of the dis-
tribution (more precisely at 55% and 50%, respectively). Crouhy et al. (2000) model a
stochastic LGD with the help of a beta distribution. They estimate the parameters by
3using bond market data. Their estimations yield the result that the LGD follows an uni-
modal beta distribution. Our contribution consists in estimating the distribution of the
LGDs of interbank exposures. We have a unique data set of realized interbank LGDs at
our disposal. This data suggests a u-shaped density for the LGD, ie a distribution with
much probability mass at zero and 100 per cent. This ﬁnding is in line with Dermine and
de Carvalho (2006) and Bastos (2010) who use a dataset of defaulted loans provided by a
large Portuguese bank and ﬁnd a u-shaped LGD distribution for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
3 Round-by-Round Algorithm
3.1 General procedure
In the event of a bank failing, the banks that have given credit to this bank suﬀer losses
from their exposures. The contagion process in the interbank market may stop after the
ﬁrst round, but may also propagate further through the system. Banks, which fell in
distress as a consequence of the initial distress, may now themselves become a source of
contagion. This process will continue round by round until the banking system reaches a
new equilibrium with a possibly huge number of failures or until the supervisory authorities
manage to put an end to this process.
In this section, we describe a simulation exercise so as to study the extent to which
the German banking system may be prone to such a contagious process. We apply the
round-by-round algorithm as described in Upper (2007).
1. Initially, bank i fails exogenously.
2. As a result, banks whose exposure to bank i multiplied by the loss given default
(LGD) exceeds their buﬀer of tier-1 capital, also fail. We deﬁne a bank to be
in default in the event that its tier-1 capital ratio is below 6 per cent of its risk-
weighted assets. This default deﬁnition is in line with the new Basel accord where
the minimum capital requirement is also set at 6%.2 We do not take into account
potential reactions of the lender banks. For example, the lender banks may have
hidden reserves which they release to increase their tier-1 capital. Instead, we assume
2See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), paragraph 50.
4that write-oﬀs on interbank loans decrease the lender’s tier-1 capital by the same
amount.
3. Further banks may fail if their combined exposure to the banks that have failed so
far (times the LGD) is greater than their capital buﬀer.
4. The contagious process stops when no new failure occurs and a new equilibrium is
reached.
Thus, bank j is in distress, if
Ej −
 
k (LGDjk · xjk · 1k∈D)
RWAj − 0.2 ·
 
k (xjk · 1k∈D)
< 0.06 (1)
In this context, Ej is the tier-1 capital of bank j, xjk is the exposure of bank j to bank
k,1 k∈D is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 in the event that bank k is in
distress (and 0 otherwise), LGDjk is the loss given default associated with the exposure
of bank j to bank k and RWAj are the risk weighted assets of bank j. We assume that
interbank claims receive a weight of 0.2 in banks’ risk weighted assets.3 When calculating
the tier-1 capital ratio, we also take into account that every claim to a bank that failed
completely disappears from the creditor bank’s risk weighted assets.
We carry out this simulation exercise for each of the 15 systemically relevant banks in
Germany. We do not include the rest of the banks in Germany because previous studies
have already shown that only a small number of banks form the so-called core of the
German interbank market and that these core banks act as an intermediary for numerous
small banks (see Craig and von Peter (2010)). Thus, the failure of a systemically relevant
bank will most likely trigger a huge amount of smaller banks to fail. However, the small
banks do generally not trigger contagious reactions. In our analysis about the vulnerability
of the German interbank market, we therefore deal only with the interconnectedness of
the systemically relevant banks.
To run the round-by-round algorithm, information is needed on (i) the pairwise ex-
posures between the banks and (ii) the appropriate loss given a bank fails. Concerning
the pairwise exposures, we have detailed information on exposures within the German
interbank market (see Section 3.2). This leaves the question of determining the loss given
3The risk weight of 0.2 follows from the Basel I and Basel II framework applied to German banks.
5default. From the literature we know that this is crucial for the contagion exercises (see
eg Upper and Worms (2004)). Diﬀerent solutions are possible.
1. Constant LGD. The loss given default is exogenously set to a constant value, say
40% or 45%.4 To account for the fact that the LGD crucially drives the results, one
can vary the constant loss given default over a wide range of values. The contagion
exercise is then run for each diﬀerent value of the LGD.
2. Endogenous LGD. If information on the actual over-indebtedness of the distressed
bank, the bankruptcy cost and the degree of collateralisation were available, it would
be possible to endogenously calculate the loss given default.
3. Stochastic LGD. Our supervisory data concerning the write-oﬀs of interbank loans
show that the loss given default considerably varies, with a large portion of the
probability mass at 0% and at 100%. A possible explanation for this quasi-dichotomy
may be that the loans are either fully collateralised (as in the Repo-market) or
completely unsecured. This ﬁnding is not in line with the assumption of a constant
LGD (solution 1). Solution 1 would rather be in line with a distribution of the LGDs
concentrated in one point.
In this study, we start with the ﬁrst solution, ie the solution in which the loss given
default is deterministic and takes on the value of the mean of our dataset.
This exercise is our benchmark. The method with stochastic LGDs (solution 3) should
then provide information on how the stochastic nature of the LGD drives the results. The
exact properties of the LGD-distribution are investigated in Section 3.3. We discard the
solution with an endogenous LGD since we lack the necessary data. Besides, our data on
realised LGDs suggest that the borrower banks’ balance sheet composition and other bank
speciﬁc variables only explain a small fraction of the LGD variation. Most LGD variation
seems to stem from the extent of collateralisation of the interbank exposures.5
4Kaufman (1994) gives an overview of loss given default estimates for bank failures; the estimates vary
considerably. James (1991) ﬁnds that the average loss of failed US banks during the period of 1985 to
1988 was about 30%. In addition, there were direct costs associated with the bank closures of 10% of the
assets. In our data set, the mean LGD is about 45%.
5We carried out a variance decomposition of the LGDs. We ﬁnd that most of the variation is due to the
lender bank (about two thirds), ie the variation owing to the balance sheet composition of the borrower
bank is less important, which is another argument for not using solution 2.
63.2 Exposure at Default (EAD)
As outlined above, the ﬁrst step for running the round-by-round algorithm consists of
establishing the matrix of mutual interbank exposures. We use Bundesbank data from
the German credit register (MiMiK) to obtain the necessary information.6 Unlike credit
registers in most other countries, the German credit register also includes interbank loans
and is not conﬁned to non-ﬁnancials. This data base oﬀers us a certain data advantage
compared to other studies since we are able to determine the complete matrix for the
systemically relevant banks. By contrast, balance sheet data only show (for each bank)
the aggregate amount lent to or borrowed from all banks. Moreover, payment data or large
exposure data are in general less comprehensive than credit register data and include, for
example in the case of payment data, only information about short-term lending.
The German credit register contains quarterly data on large exposures of banks to
individual borrowers or single borrower units (eg groups). Banking institutions located in
Germany are required to report if their exposures to an individual borrower or the sum of
exposures to borrowers belonging to one borrower unit exceeds the threshold of EUR 1.5m
at least once in the respective quarter. We think that the threshold of EUR 1.5m does
not cause a serious bias since the typical interbank loan is relatively large and exceeds the
threshold of EUR 1.5m.
The credit register applies a broad deﬁnition of loan. Loans in this sense include tra-
ditional loans, bonds, oﬀ-balance sheet positions and exposures from derivative positions.
However, trading book positions are excluded. We analyze gross exposures, as opposed
to netting bilateral exposures. We do not net, because, in the event of a bank failing, it
is not clear whether a netting can be enforced.7 For the simulation exercise, we use data
from the second quarter 2010.
3.3 Stochastic Loss Given Default (LGD)
The second key component for the contagion exercise is the loss given default (LGD). We
have some information about the loss rate banks face in the event of a borrowing bank’s
default. While we do not know the LGD of the lender bank for a default of a speciﬁc
6See Schmieder (2006) for more details about this database.
7See Mistrulli (2007) for this and other arguments concerning the simulation method.
7borrower bank, we know for each lender bank the average LGD of interbank exposures
(at an annual frequency). Speciﬁcally, for each bank and each year, we have data on the
volume of non-performing interbank loans and on the corresponding write-downs. From
this data, we can derive the realization of the LGD in the interbank market for a given
bank in a given year. The data are taken from the quantitative supervisory reports for
banks in Germany, collected by the Bundesbank.8 Based on this data, we can estimate
the distribution of LGDs.
Since our simulations of the contagion exercise only consider systemically relevant
banks, we focus on data of private commercial banks and the large central institutions
of the savings and cooperative banks. Regional savings and cooperative banks, which
are generally small and medium-sized, are left out. The reason is that we consider their
position in the German interbank market as less representative for our stability analysis
because these banks’ interbank market activities are very much characterized by relation-
ships to their central institutes. This is not the case for smaller private banks that we
therefore included in the data set. Our dataset of LGDs consists of 344 observations for
the period 1998-2008. Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of the LGDs.9
Visual inspection of the LGD distribution suggests to use a a beta distribution for










where Γ(·) is the Gamma-function. The parameters α>0 and β>0 determine the shape
of this distribution.10 The beta distribution is especially suitable for modelling LGD
because (i) the domain is conﬁned to the economic sensible interval from 0 to 1, (ii) it is
highly ﬂexible and (iii) nests other distributions.11 For instance, when both parameters
equal one, then the beta distribution becomes a uniform distribution. When both of the
8For more details on these data see Memmel and Stein (2008).
9The data set that includes all banking groups also has a u-shaped frequency distribution with slightly
more probability mass at zero and slightly less probability mass at one.
10Figure 5 summarizes the possible shapes of the probability density function dependent on the parameter
values.
11See eg Hahn and Shapiro (1967), pp.91.
8parameters are smaller than one, the probability density function is u-shaped with a large
portion of the probability mass close to zero and one. For parameter values close to
zero, this distribution converges to the binomial distribution. By contrast, the density is
unimodal in the case of both parameters α and β being greater than one. For very large
parameter values, it converges to the degenerate distribution, where the entire probability
mass is concentrated on one point. The expectation and the variance of a random variable








(α + β)2(α + β +1 )
(5)
Given estimates for the expectation and the variance, estimators for the parameters α and
β are obtained by solving the equations (4) and (5) for α and β, respectively:12
ˆ α =ˆ μ
 
ˆ μ(1 − ˆ μ)
ˆ σ2 − 1
 
(6)
ˆ β =( 1− ˆ μ)
 
ˆ μ(1 − ˆ μ)
ˆ σ2 − 1
 
(7)
Using the sample mean ˆ μ and variance ˆ σ2 as an estimator for the population mean and
variance, we obtain ˆ μ =0 .45 and ˆ σ2 =0 .15. Inserting ˆ μ and ˆ σ2 into equation (6) and (7)
yields ˆ α =0 .28 and ˆ β =0 .35. These parameter values suggest a u-shaped distribution
(see Figure 5).
Figure 4 also contains the probability density function of a beta distribution with the
estimated parameters. Compared to the empirical frequency distribution, only small devi-
ations can be observed. Statistical tests conﬁrm this observation. The null hypothesis of a
χ2 goodness-of-ﬁt test that our data follow a beta distribution with estimated parameters
ˆ α and ˆ β, cannot be rejected on a 5% signiﬁcance level. Choosing ten equidistant inter-
vals and comparing the observed frequency to the expected frequency within the intervals
yields a p-value of ≈ 0.075.13
12This procedure is called method of matching moments, see eg Hahn and Shapiro (1967), p.95. We
do not use maximum likelihood-estimation because there is a considerable amount of observations which
equal exactly 0 and 1 and for which, therefore, the likelihood function is not deﬁned.
13The result of this test gives strong evidence that the assumed distribution is very close to the observed
9As an additional robustness check for the use of the beta distribution with estimated
parameters, we also run simulations by drawing from the discrete distribution observed
by the data. For this purpose, we randomly choose observations out of the data set with
each observation number occurring with equal probability (see Section 4.3).
The results obtained from our dataset may also have further implications for the liter-
ature on LGD modelling. As already mentioned, the null hypothesis that our data sample
follows a beta distribution with parameters ˆ α =0 .28 and ˆ β =0 .35 cannot be rejected on
a 5% signiﬁcance level. However, in the literature, LGDs are often not modelled as fol-
lowing a u-shaped beta distribution (i.e. α<1 and β<1), but as following an unimodal
distribution (in the case of the beta distribution, this implies that α>1 and β>1) or
as being constant. Thus, our next step is to explicitly test whether the LGD distribution
is really u-shaped, i.e. we test the null hypothesis that α ≥ 1o rβ ≥ 1. We carry out a
sequence of two t-tests with the two null hypotheses α ≥ 1 and β ≥ 1, respectively. In
the event that we can reject both null hypotheses, we accept the hypothesis α<1 and
β<1. Given the same signiﬁcance level in both t-tests, the signiﬁcance level of the joint
hypothesis α<1 and β<1 is at least as strong (see Frahm (2010)).
Using the delta-method and the relations given in Equations (6) and (7), we derive
the asymptotic distribution of the estimates for ˆ α and ˆ β, respectively. Using a ﬁrst-order
Taylor expansion, the delta method gives us a relation between the variance-covariance
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distribution, as the test is very sensitive due to the large number of observations. To illustrate the correla-
tion between the number of observations and the sensitiveness of the test, we run simulations with a sample
randomly drawn from a beta distribution. Drawing 10,000 times 344 observations from a beta(0.28,0.35)-
distribution and testing each sample against a beta(0.18,0.25)-distribution yields a probability of making a
type II error (ie the error of falsely accepting the null hypothesis) of around 18%. Repeating this exercise
for only half of the sample (ie drawing 172 observations each time) leads to a probability of making a type
II error of 62%. Thus, the larger the sample, the more sensitive the test becomes to only small deviations
from the distribution tested.
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where μ3 and μ4 denote the third and fourth central moments, respectively.14 For imple-
mentation purposes, we replace the true moments by their estimators, i.e. ˆ σ2,ˆ μ3 and ˆ μ4
are given by 1
N−1
 N








i=1 (xi − ˆ μ)
4, respectively.15
From the Equations (8) and (9), we see that the variances of ˆ α and ˆ β are linear combina-
tions of σ2
























































=0 .0013. As a
next step, we use these values to calculate the test statistics T for the t-test with the null
hypothesis that α>1 and β>1. The results Tα ≈− 27 and Tβ ≈− 18 clearly show that
the null hypothesis can be rejected. Thus, we can conclude that, contrary to the common
assumption of an unimodal LGD distribution in the literature, our dataset of the LGD
follows a u-shaped distribution.
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate results
We start with simulations using a constant LGD (see discussion in Section 3.1). Results
are then taken as benchmark to simulations using stochastic values.
In the simulations with a constant LGD, we assume a value of 45%, which is equal to
the mean of our actual LGD values. The initial assumption is that one of the 15 banks
fails. This could trigger a cascade of failures, if the ratio of tier-1 capital to risk weighted
assets of one of the creditor banks falls below 6%. For a constant LGD, we obtain one
14See, for example, Mood et al. (1974), pp. 228, and Zhang (2007) for the variances and covariances of
the estimators ˆ μ and ˆ σ
2.
15See Hahn and Shapiro (1967), pp. 48.
11number of bank defaults occurring in the system, dependent on the bank that fails ﬁrst.
We repeat this exercise by varying the bank that fails ﬁrst from bank number 1 to 15.
As a result, we obtain a frequency distribution of the number of bank failures. Figure 1
shows that in 47% of the cases, which is equivalent to 7 out of 15 initial bank defaults, no
further bank failure occurs. In 13% of the cases we have one subsequent bank failure (ie
in total two bank defaults). Figure 2 illustrates that in only 13% of the cases more than
six bank defaults occur. The failure of one of the 15 systemically relevant German banks
thus leads to an average of 3.7 bank defaults altogether.

































Figure 1: Frequency distribution of bank failures for constant LGD and
stochastic LGD.
The second set of simulations (based on a stochastic LGD) is carried out by drawing
from a beta distribution with parameters α =0 .28 and β =0 .35. This means that, for
each exposure of a creditor bank to a bank in distress, we randomly draw an LGD value
from the beta distribution estimated in Section 3.3. Again, we simulate by varying the
bank that fails ﬁrst exogenously. In contrast to simulations based on a constant LGD,
the approach with a stochastic LGD yields for each of the 15 banks a distribution of the
number of banks in distress (and not only one single number of subsequent failures). We
repeat the contagion exercise 100,000 times for each bank, each time another of the 15





























Figure 2: Distribution function of bank failures for constant LGD and stochas-
tic LGD.
banks starts the contagious process.
Figure 1 gives the relative frequency of the number of bank failures, where we assume
that the probability of the initial failure is the same for all of the 15 banks. The ﬁgure
shows that, in 39% of the 1,500,000 simulation runs, no further failure occurs. By contrast,
in case of a constant LGD of 45%, 7 out of 15 banks (= 47%) do not initiate a contagious
process. Moreover, the overall expected number of bank defaults, given the failure of one
of the 15 banks, is higher in the case of a stochastic LGD (5.6 banks in distress) than in
the case of a constant LGD (3.7 banks in distress).
However, the comparison of entire distributions, only on the basis of their expected
values, may neglect important parts of the distributions. This is especially true for dis-
tributions with a large amount of probability mass at the boundaries, as in our case. A
stronger concept is the concept of stochastic dominance which is often used, for instance,
in decision theory when the outcomes of two risky projects have to be compared (see eg
Bawa (1975)). A cumulative distribution F is said to stochastically dominate the distri-
bution G,i fF(x) ≤ G(x) for all x (and strict inequality for at least one point). Figure 2
shows that the empirical cumulative distribution function of the results for the stochastic
13LGD Fstoch(·) dominates the one for the constant LGD Fconst(·), ie the distribution func-
tion Fstoch(·) is always below the function Fconst(·). In this context, (ﬁrst order) stochastic
dominance means that any society preferring less failures to more failures considers the
case of stochastic LGDs as inferior to the case of constant LGDs. In other words, with only
few assumptions about the society’s preferences (especially non-saturation), we are able
to show that the loss distribution with the assumption of stochastic LGD is less desirable
than the loss distribution under the assumption of a corresponding constant LGD.
From an economic perspective, ﬁgure 2 illustrates that simulations based on a constant
LGD tend to underestimate the risks to ﬁnancial stability by a bank failure. Contagion
eﬀects and therefore potential losses in the banking system may be substantially larger,
implying a more fragile banking system. Since simulation studies on interbank conta-
gion usually assume a constant LGD, this suggests that contagion risks have often been
underestimated in the literature so far.
4.2 Identifying banks with similar contagion patterns
After examining aggregate results of the banking system, we investigate the disaggregate
simulation results dependent on the trigger bank. We focus on the simulation results with
a stochastic LGD. There are three possible patterns for the distribution of the number of
bank failures, given a certain trigger bank.
1. A distribution with a large portion of probability mass concentrated on the bound-
aries of the distribution, ie in most of the 100,000 iterations either a very low or a
very high number of banks fail. This is the case for 7 of the 15 trigger banks. In all
these cases, the expected number of bank defaults is higher in the stochastic model
compared to the constant LGD of 0.45. Figure 6 shows an example for this pattern.
2. An almost unimodal distribution with a large portion of probability mass concen-
trated on one point. In two cases, the peak of the distribution is at a high number
of bank failures (see Figure 7). It is remarkable that only in these two cases, the
expected number of bank defaults is lower in the stochastic model. In four cases, the
peak of the distribution is at a low number of bank failures (see Figure 8). These
remaining four cases have again a higher expected number of bank defaults in the
stochastic case.
143. A degenerate distribution with all probability mass concentrated on the left bound-
ary (see Figure 9), ie those banks do not initiate a contagious process. This happens
in two cases. By deﬁnition, the results of the stochastic and the constant LGD are
then identical.
In Table 1 we give an overview of summary statistics of the three groups. This table reads
Group Number Bank failures (average across groups)
of banks mean standard dev.
1 7 7.0 5.3
2 6 5.5 3.2
3 2 1.0 0.0
Table 1: Average mean and average standard deviation of bank failures for
the three groups of banks (group 1 = large probability mass at the boundaries
of the distribution, 2 = unimodal distribution, 3 = degenerate distribution).
as follows. The ﬁrst group consists of seven banks. We choose each of the seven banks as
the bank that exogenously fails, and then calculate the mean and the standard deviation
of the number of banks in distress in the simulation runs. The average across these seven
means is 7.0, the average standard deviation is 5.3.
When we compare the standard deviations in the ﬁrst and second group, we ﬁnd
that the standard deviations in the ﬁrst group are considerably higher. This diﬀerence is
due to the ﬁnding that banks in the ﬁrst group have a bimodal distribution concerning
the frequency of banks in distress, while those in the second group have an unimodal
distribution. In the third group, as no subsequent bank failures occur, the mean of bank
failures is one and the standard deviation is zero.
Our ﬁndings overall indicate a high degree of heterogeneity in the results. First, the
exact distribution of bank failures depends on the trigger bank. Whether the simulations
with a constant LGD over- or underestimate the results on average compared to the
stochastic LGD, depends on the shape of the distribution of bank failures. Second, for a
given trigger bank, diﬀerent scenarios occur. Especially in case of the u-shaped distribution
of the number of bank defaults (ie pattern 1), a fortunate combination of LGDs indicates
a stable system, ie a low number of subsequent bank defaults. If there is an unfortunate
15combination of LGDs, however, the number of bank defaults increases sharply. Thus,
while the simulations with a constant LGD yield only one single result of bank defaults,
the simulations with a stochastic LGD enable to distinguish between diﬀerent scenarios.
4.3 Robustness checks
We carry out robustness checks concerning two issues. First, to investigate the sensitivity
of our results with respect to the assumed distribution, we draw from the discrete distribu-
tion observed by the data instead of the beta distribution. For this purpose, one observed
LGD value is randomly allocated to each exposure of a creditor bank to a bank in distress.
Compared to drawing the LGD from a beta distribution, the results of this exercise do not
diﬀer much. The average amount of bank failures in the stochastic case is 5.5 (compared
to 5.6 in Section 4.1). Furthermore, if we look at the relative frequency distribution as
well as the cumulative distribution function of the total number of bank failures, there are
virtually no diﬀerences to the results of the simulations with the beta-distributed LGD.
Hence, the empirical cumulative distribution function of bank failures with a stochastic
LGD still stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution function of bank failures
with a constant LGD. Moreover, the distribution of the number of bank failures for a given
trigger bank reveals for each bank the same pattern as in Section 4.2. We can therefore
conclude that drawing from the beta distribution is a good approximation for our observed
LGD values.
Second, we examine the impact of including oﬀ-balance sheet positions in our simula-
tions. Most literature on interbank contagion ignores oﬀ-balance-sheet exposures, while
we have considered them in our above simulations. We therefore repeat the simulation
exercise by excluding oﬀ-balance sheet positions. According to our dataset, the share of
oﬀ-balance-sheet exposures to total exposures varies considerably between banks. Not
surprisingly, banks with a high amount of oﬀ-balance-sheet positions on their liability side
trigger much less bank failures when ignoring these exposures. In total, the average amount
of bank failures is only 4.1 (compared to 5.6 when considering all exposures). Again, the
cumulative distribution function of bank failures using a stochastic LGD stochastically
dominates the cumulative distribution function of bank failures using a constant LGD.
The shape of the distribution of bank defaults for a given trigger bank, however, changes
for two banks. These two banks exhibit the highest share of oﬀ-balance-sheet positions on



















































Figure 3: Diﬀerence between the relative frequency distributions of bank fail-
ures considering total exposures and considering only balance sheet exposures.
their liability side.
To elaborate the diﬀerences between the simulation results with and without oﬀ-
balance-sheet exposures, we calculate the diﬀerence between the two relative frequency
distributions of bank failures (see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows, for example, that the overall
probability of observing only one bank failure (ie contagion eﬀects not occurring) is four
percentage points higher when only considering balance sheet exposures. For high numbers
of bank defaults, the result is reversed. For instance, the overall probability of observing
14 bank failures is nine percentage points higher when oﬀ-balance-sheet exposures are con-
sidered. Thus, Figure 3 shows that the inclusion of oﬀ-balance-sheet exposures leads to a
higher probability of observing extreme events and therefore captures tail risk in a more
adequate way. Therefore, we can conclude that oﬀ-balance-sheet exposures considerably
contribute to the interdependence of banks and possibly change the results of the stability
analysis in a remarkable way.
175 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate contagion risk in the German interbank market. We have
access to a unique data set about loss given defaults (LGDs) of interbank exposures. Our
data reveal that the frequency distribution of the LGD is u-shaped, ie defaults of interbank
loans often imply either a loss of 0 or 100 per cent. This bimodal distribution stands in
contrast to the assumption of an unimodal LGD distribution in the literature.
Next, we run simulations investigating the extent of potential contagion in the German
interbank market. For this purpose, we focus on 15 systematically relevant German banks.
For our simulations, we compare the outcome of two diﬀerent assumptions. First, we run
simulations assuming a constant LGD that equals the average LGD value in our dataset.
The assumption of a constant LGD is the standard approach in the literature. Second,
we use a stochastic LGD by drawing from a beta distribution. The shape of the beta
distribution is derived from our LGD data set. With the help of the concept of stochastic
dominance, we show that contagion eﬀects tend to increase when we replace a constant
LGD with a stochastic one. This ﬁnding indicates that the traditional literature with the
assumption of constant LGDs underestimates the severity of contagious processes.
On the bank level, we identify three types of banks: banks whose initial failure either
leads to a high or low a number of further failures, depending on the probability path;
banks whose initial failure leads to an unimodal distribution of subsequent failures; and
banks that even in the worst scenarios do not trigger any further bank defaults because
other banks’ exposures are not high enough. For banks belonging to the ﬁrst group,
the number of subsequent bank failures is not predictable for eg a regulatory institution
without knowing the exact LGD-values. For these banks it is reasonable to have a more
detailed look at the data and eg identify the crucial interbank exposures that drive the
results. Though the danger of domino eﬀects caused by a bank from the second group can
be high (when the peak of the distribution is at a high number of bank failures), there is
not much uncertainty about it. Thus, it is not diﬃcult to predict the number of subsequent
bank failures. The failure of one of the banks belonging to the third group looks, at ﬁrst
sight, unproblematic for the rest of the ﬁnancial system as no further systemically relevant
bank fails for sure. However, one has to be careful with this assessment as we did not
take into account the numerous small banks that have direct exposures to the systemically
relevant banks. Furthermore, we only consider direct domino eﬀects in our analysis and
18abstract from other eﬀects that can occur in times of crisis.
An open question for future research is to compare the loss distribution at diﬀerent
points in time and to develop an indicator showing by how far the interbank market is
prone to contagious processes.
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Figure 4: Relative frequency of the loss given default for interbank loans,
derived from data on German private commercial banks and the central insti-













Figure 5: Shapes of the probability density function of the beta distribution
dependent on the values of α and β.
24Figure 6 to 9: Diﬀerent distribution patterns
Note: These pictures show diﬀerent distribution patterns of bank failures dependent on
which bank fails ﬁrst. Each picture is created by assuming that one particular bank fails
ﬁrst. The total number of bank failures occuring because of domino eﬀects is then calcu-
lated by drawing an LGD value from the beta distribution for each interbank exposure.
This exercise is repeated 100,000 times for each bank. In this context, three contagion
patterns can be observed dependent on the trigger bank: A u-shaped distribution of bank
failures (see Figure 6 and pattern 1 in Section 4.2), an unimodal distribution of bank
failures (see Figures 7 and 8 and pattern 2 in Section 4.2) and a degenerate distribution
of bank failures (see Figure 9 and pattern 3 in Section 4.2).


























result LGD = 0.45 mean result of
stochastic LGD
Figure 6: Example of a distribution of bank failures with a large amount of
probability mass at the boundaries of the distribution.






























LGD = 0.45 mean result of stochastic LGD
Figure 7: Example of a distribution of bank failures with a large amount of
probability mass concentrated on a high number of bank failures.




























result LGD = 0.45
mean result of stochastic LGD
Figure 8: Example of a distribution of bank failures with a large amount of
probability mass concentrated on a low number of bank failures.






























Total number of failures
result LGD = 0.45
= mean result of stochastic LGD
Figure 9: Example of a degenerate distribution of bank failures.
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